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Moral Purity and Moral Progress:
The Tension between Assurance and Perfection in Kant and Wesley1
Kevin Twain Lowery

Introduction
In Christian theology, the desire for assurance is somewhat at odds with the quest
for moral perfection, for assurance is a state of security regarding one’s salvation, and
this can undermine the impulse to pursue perfection, which requires a certain
dissatisfaction with one’s present state. In this paper I will explore this point of tension
in the thought of both Kant and Wesley, and I will endeavor to show that Wesley’s
broader definition of moral motivation allows him to resolve this tension in a manner that
is inaccessible to Kant on his own terms.

Relating Wesley to Kant
At first glance, Wesley and Kant seem to be rather unlikely conversation partners.
For one thing, there is no evidence that they were familiar with one another whatsoever.
In fact, it appears that Kant was at best indirectly influenced by Locke, whom we know
impacted Wesley’s thought in particular ways.2 In addition, Kant’s view of religion is
vastly different from that of Wesley. Kant claims that morality essentially has no need of
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religion, but only requires pure practical reason.3 In fact, even the concept of God is a
byproduct of morality.
Natural morality must be so constituted that it can be thought
independently of any concept of God, and elicit our most zealous devotion
solely on account of its own inner worth and excellence. But it serves to
increase our devotion if after we have taken an interest in morals itself, to
take interest also in the existence of God, a being who can reward our
good conduct. And then we will obtain strong incentives which will
determine us to the observance of moral laws. This is a highly necessary
hypothesis.4
In other words, Kant claims that morality is independent of the concept of God, as
well as many other religious concepts. As a result, religion is relegated to a position
inferior to morality. Whereas morality is necessary in and of itself, religious concepts
like the concept of God are construed as practically necessary moral concepts.5 Kant
understands religion itself to be little more than recognizing all our duties as God’s
commands.6 Religion is not only dependent on morality, religion is essentially derived
from it. For Kant, the foundation of religious faith should be morality itself, since
“nothing firmer or more certain can be thought in any science than our obligation to
moral actions.”7
Wesley and Kant were both raised in pietistic homes, but they later separated
themselves from pietism. In Wesley’s case, he not only gradually distanced himself from
Pietists like the Moravians, he aligned himself with the Anglican moderates on a number
3
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of issues.8 As far as Kant is concerned, although he was a rationalist, it can be argued
that he never completely severed himself from his pietistic roots, intellectually speaking.
He defines true piety as “moral conduct in accordance with the divine beneficent will.”9
In essence, Kant’s ties to pietism were loose at best, and he also separated himself from
traditional orthodox Christianity in key ways, reflected most sharply in the ways that he
sterilized many religious terms and themes. It should therefore be noted that when Kant
uses language that is characteristic of Wesley’s thought, he is not indicating quite the
same thing as Wesley. Then again, I believe that there is enough overlap in meaning
such that Kant’s general concepts can be related to Wesley’s beliefs in specific ways, and
this should become more evident as the comparison unfolds.

Kant on Perfection
Kant asserts that we have a duty to pursue our own perfection as moral agents in
two respects. First, we must cultivate our faculties (i.e. natural predispositions),
especially our understanding, since it is the highest faculty we possess. Second, we must
cultivate the will for two reasons: a) so that we might raise ourselves from animality to
humanity by setting ends for ourselves, diminishing our ignorance, and correcting our
errors, and b) so that the moral law itself might become our incentive for conforming
with duty.10 There is thus a distinction between quantitative and qualitative perfection,
and both facets must be pursued.11
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Kant claims that the perfection of our faculties is necessary so that the dictates of
the will can be made operative.12 However, since morality excludes everything which
does not contribute to the perfection of our inner moral worth, it cannot dictate the
manner in which all our powers and capacities should be perfected, for that is a pragmatic
affair. One thing is certain, our mental powers must be perfected most of all, because
they have the greatest influence on our moral conduct.13 Moral perfection requires not
only strength of will, but also proper judgment.14 More generally, the duty to develop
one’s natural perfection is derived from Kant’s demand that we treat humanity as an end
in itself. Again, this does not necessitate endorsing particular maxims of perfection, it
only requires the acceptance of the goal of natural self-improvement.15
For Kant, perfection concerns the will itself and the motives which guide it, not
merely the knowledge which informs it.16 Humanity is thus completed and perfected in
the realization of “personality,” i.e. a good will.17 As Phil Quinn explains, “complete
moral perfection is constituted of both a morally good disposition to act purely on the
incentives provided by the moral law and a morally good course of life full of deeds in
harmony with that disposition.”18 Kant does make a distinction between being holy, i.e.
having a pure disposition to duty, and being perfect, i.e. “fulfilling all one’s duties and …
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attaining completely one’s moral end with regard to oneself.”19 Moral perfection is thus
subjective with respect to one’s inner disposition to duty, but objective with respect to the
fulfillment of duty and the achievement of one’s own moral end.20
Kant likewise makes a distinction between virtue and holiness: “Virtue implies
ability and readiness to overcome our inclination to evil on moral principles … Thus holy
beings are not virtuous, for the reason that they have no evil inclinations to overcome;
their will is of itself sufficient for compliance with the law.”21 In this way, a holy will,
i.e. one which is absolutely good, can only belong to God, since God is the only being
that has no evil inclinations. Humans can only aspire to holiness by acting from duty in
spite of subjective inclinations and desires.22 According to Kant, “The moral condition
which [we] can always be in is virtue, i.e. moral disposition in conflict, and not holiness
in the supposed possession of perfect purity of the dispositions of will.”23 In other words,
given the fact that virtue involves overcoming evil inclinations while holiness is the
absence of evil inclinations altogether, human beings can be virtuous, but not holy. On
the other hand, God can be holy, but not virtuous.
Kant says that the first command of the duties we have to ourselves is to know
ourselves not with respect to our natural perfection, but with respect to our moral
perfection.24 Even though we cannot be conscious of performing our duty from
completely unselfish motives, it is still what morality requires of us.25 It can thus be said
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that Kant views moral motivation as opaque, since he thinks that we cannot be absolutely
certain of the purity of our motives.26
For Kant, perfection is motivated by a love and respect for virtue and for the
moral law itself. Granted, it can be argued that the motivation behind Kantian perfection
is ultimately grounded in respect for our own rational nature.27 For instance, J. B.
Schneewind indicates that “Rousseau convinced Kant that everyone must have the
capacity to be a self-governing moral agent, and that it is this characteristic that gives
each person a special kind of value or dignity.”28 However, there is little evidence to
suggest that the Kantian stress on treating people as ends in themselves is anything more
than a respect for rationality itself, so it does not seem that this aspect of Kant’s thought
can dismiss all charges of formalism.

Kant’s Concept of Moral Purity
A rather problematic part of Kant’s doctrine of perfection is his concept of moral
purity, for it excludes motives that allow a more positive tension between perfection and
assurance. Consequently, it would be helpful to elaborate on this concept before
proceeding to Kant’s view of assurance.
One of Kant’s most famous tenets is that a good will is the only thing that is good
without qualification (i.e. it is intrinsically good).29 Since the possibility of morality rests
upon the existence and exercise of human autonomy, one of morality’s chief aims is to
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respect this autonomy. This is evident in all three formulations of the Categorical
Imperative. Kant claims that a good will is not only the source of the individual’s
absolute moral worth, it is that which gives the world a final purpose.30 Good willing is
the foundation of virtue, which of course is the “ability and readiness to overcome our
inclination to evil on moral principles.” This is what leads him to equate strength of
virtue with strength of character.31 The goodness of the will is essentially revealed in
adversity. Consequently, Kant’s ethics has often been characterized as an ethic of good
willing, not of good intentions.32 In reality, Kant’s ethics does not separate willing from
the intentions. However, the emphasis is clearly on the exercise of the will. In other
words, morality not only requires that our intentions be proper, they must also be
sufficiently strong so as to result in an exercise of will.
William Hund indicates that for Kant “any object of the will, even the concept of
perfection, would endanger the purity of the will if this object were to determine the
will.”33 Viggo Rossvaer also realizes that the pure will for Kant is not empirically
determined. “Reason’s evaluation of our intentions recognizes the superiority of the
pure, non-sensuous will over our sensuous incentives by giving it an absolute, maximum
value. This maximum value in the pure, non-sensuously determined will is what is
referred to when we speak of the good will.”34 As Lewis White Beck points out, Kant’s
concern is with the intentions, but the basis for morality is rationality itself, not the
empirical nature of human beings. 35 In essence, Kant believes that moral motivation
30
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cannot be external, since external motivation is heteronomous and not conducive to
universal necessity. Consequently, moral motivation must be strictly internal.36 For
example, Kant asserts that deathbed repentance has no moral worth because it originates
in impure motives. To be specific, the nearness of death itself provides an external
incentive that makes motivation heteronomous.37
Beck is absolutely correct when he claims that Kant’s concept of moral purity
denies the empirical nature of human beings, for even though our rationality gives us a
certain degree of transcendence over our empirical selves, we cannot neatly segregate
autonomous reason (i.e. “pure reason”) from the empirical influences which shape us.
Allen Wood concludes that the real problem for Kant is that he “confused the fact that
inclinations are necessary for the existence of moral evil with the mistaken view that in
man inclinations are the source of the threats to moral perfection.”38 Essentially, Kant
only sees the negative potential in our empirical selves. He fails to recognize the fact that
our inclinations can also lead to our own moral perfection.

The Tension between Assurance and Perfection
According to Kant, saving faith entails faith in the satisfaction of one’s sins and
faith that one can become well-pleasing to God.39 It is Gordon Michalson’s opinion that
Kant’s “belief in atonement really only amounts to a belief in our own rational capacity
to become well-pleasing to God – a potential savior figure, in whom we would believe,
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merely embodies a moral capacity available to all.”40 In light of Kant’s assertion that
God regards our moral progress as a completed whole, it could be argued that Kant
means more than this, that he at least understands satisfaction to involve an act of divine
forgiveness. However, this would still fall far short of a traditional Christian view of
atonement. Quinn surmises that Kant’s real objection is to the belief that human
sinfulness is somehow transferred from generation to generation: “Any doctrine of
vicarious atonement will be difficult, if not impossible, to square with a conviction that is
central to the conceptual scheme of common sense morality,” namely, that “moral credits
and debits are neither transferable nor transmissible.”41
A tension arises in this aspect of Kant’s thought, for he recognizes that the belief
in justification by faith counters the belief that we shall be held responsible for the
conduct of our lives. As such, justification by faith tends to undermine the incentive we
have to progress morally. In other words, assurance gives us a certain satisfaction with
out present state, and this counteracts our motivation to progress morally. Nevertheless,
justification by faith is necessary for having a clear conscience (i.e. being able to regard
oneself as pleasing to God).42 In fact, the need for a clear conscience is ongoing. In that
regard, Kant asserts that our moral shortcomings do not need to torment us, because as
long as we are progressing morally, God regards our infinite moral progress as a
completed whole.43 John Hare speculates that this assertion could be regarded as Kant’s
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version of the doctrine of imputed righteousness. Like his insistence on faith in
satisfaction, it is one of his attempts to preserve Reformation doctrines.44
A similar tension can be observed in the thought of Wesley. Both Wesley and
Kant consider moral progress to be an integral part of salvation, and this primarily
involves the purification and the perfection of the will. Even though they hold different
standards of moral purity, they both assert that the will must be properly motivated. For
Kant, moral motivation comes from a respect for duty itself. For Wesley, it comes from
love for God and for others. In both cases, pure motives cannot be self-centered.
Consequently, it appears that moral purity can only be achieved if one’s conscience is
clear, and this is only possible if moral agents can believe that God has forgiven them of
their sins. Otherwise, good works cannot be morally pure since they will largely be an
attempt to earn justification. The attempt to earn justification could be rooted in a desire
to be morally worthy, a desire to be free from guilt, or a desire to atone for one’s own
sins. In any case, these desires preclude moral purity both for Kant and for Wesley.
Of course, Wesley does not recoil from the traditional doctrine of original sin as
does Kant. Nonetheless, the basic elements of Wesley’s account of assurance bear some
resemblance to Kant’s description. Frederick Dreyer asserts that that Wesley understands
faith to be manifested through confidence in one’s pardon (i.e. the witness of the Spirit)
and in holy affections (i.e. the fruit of the Spirit).45 This dual emphasis is indeed
indicative of Wesley’s struggle to find a mediating position between antinomianism and
legalism. Without the doctrine of justification by faith, the result is works righteousness.
However, emphasizing justification by faith can lead to trivializing the need for good
44
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works. Consequently, part of Wesley’s attempt to resolve this tension is his assertion that
repentance must surpass mere sorrow for one’s sins and include an entire change of heart
and life.46
Wesley subscribes to the traditional view that divine forgiveness is bestowed
freely by the grace of God when one trusts in the merits of Christ’s atonement. When
believers truly believe that their sins have been forgiven, their guilt and shame are
dispelled, and they are given a fresh start in life with a clear conscience. Of course,
attaining a clear conscience regarding the harm we have caused others requires more than
this, because we must also ask for their forgiveness and try to make restitution for our
sins toward them. In regard to one’s attitude toward God, although a convert’s motives
may be self-interested in seeking justification, the justified believer no longer needs to be
concerned with meriting the favor of God, and good works can now be done through
unselfish love. Agents are thus enabled to move beyond self-interest and progress toward
moral purity.47
I suggest that this particular point is one which Kant cannot ultimately make,
since he refuses to embrace the notion of unmerited grace. Rather, he claims that we
must make ourselves worthy of divine assistance, the respect of others, and happiness.
Kant places such heavy emphasis on human responsibility that it becomes inappropriate
to see salvation as a free gift from God. Granted, he would most likely argue that
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salvation is free in the sense that God is not obligated to forgive us. However, he still
suggests that we must strive to earn God’s forgiveness. As a result, it does not appear
that he can ever assert anything more than works righteousness, and this certainly falls
short of his standard of moral purity, i.e. performing duty for its own sake, not for one’s
own sake. Moreover, it is unlikely that Kant would join Wesley in asserting that the
incentive to progress morally should originate in gratitude to God.
Wesley carefully defines the limits of human moral responsibility, because he
wants moral purity to be attainable. Specifically, he contends that believers are not
condemned for: 1) past sins (since they have already been forgiven), 2) present sins
(since believers do not commit them), 3) inward sinful inclinations, 4) impure (i.e.
mixed) motives, 5) “sins of infirmity” (i.e. transgressions committed out of ignorance),
and 6) that which is beyond our control.48 However, Wesley is not attempting to reduce
our moral responsibility, for he insists that we must strive for the highest attainments of
holiness. In William Cannon’s mind, Wesley’s assertion “that man can be righteous and
indeed must be righteous if he is to be Christian means that his final salvation includes
moral attainment and personal purity as essential elements. Without inherent personal
holiness, Wesley says, no man can see God.”49 Of course, Wesley believes that true
morality is not found in keeping the letter of the law, but in keeping the spirit of the law.
In this way, our righteousness exceeds that of the Pharisees.50
For Wesley, moral transformation should be judged by the results it produces. As
Cannon points out, “And always in defending the validity of his preaching and the work
48
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of his movement, John Wesley pointed to the moral successes, to the fact that men’s lives
were changed and that they produced in deeds and character the fruit of their faith.”51 A
Wesleyan understanding of assurance must therefore include both the belief that one’s
sins have been forgiven as well as a firm conviction that one’s life has been changed to
the extent that significant moral progress is being made and will continue to be made.

Kantian Attempts to Resolve the Dilemma
The Need for a Moral Revolution
Kant’s own attempt to resolve this dilemma is perhaps the least satisfying. To be
specific, he claims that we need a moral revolution to attain a good will. Wood asserts
that for Kant, the will always chooses according to rules; it never chooses only particular
acts.52 Essentially, Kant believes that each of us acts according to subjective principles,
which he calls maxims. He claims that human beings are not evil because of the acts they
perform, but because their constitution allows the inference of evil maxims.
Consequently, the ground of evil is not in a determining power of inclination, but in the
exercise of freedom in forming maxims.53 In essence, good and evil are not found in the
nature of things, but in the exercise of reason. The same principle holds true for actions
as well, for the moral worth of duties performed does not come from the purposes they
achieve, but from the maxims which determine them.54 The mere conformity of an action
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with law is its legality, but the conformity of an action’s motive with the incentive of
duty is its morality.55
In order to be morally pure, we must have a morally good supreme maxim, i.e. a
maxim to be unconditionally committed to being moral. According to Kant, we are
always influenced by both moral and sensuous motives.56 Happiness is necessarily the
desire of every rational being. Consequently, good and evil in the human will is not in
the presence or absence of incentives, but in the subordination of one incentive to
another.57 Notwithstanding, humans cannot be part good and part evil, for each person
has a single basic disposition to morality which either is or is not fully committed to
being moral.58 This basic disposition to morality is for all intents and purposes a
“supreme maxim,” which serves as the ground of all other maxims.59 After all, our
general attitude toward morality largely determines the particular morals we embrace and
practice.
Kant espouses the view that human beings are naturally “radically evil.” The
radical evil of human nature cannot be extirpated by human forces, but it can be
overcome.60 Quinn thinks that this particular doctrine is a fairly good rationalization of
the traditional doctrine of original sin.61 Kant regarded the fall symbolically as the
triumph of self-love over duty within each individual.62 The radically evil disposition is
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personally adopted through a free, non-temporal choice.63 Denis Savage interprets this
point as meaning that the disposition to evil is chosen after the disposition to morality is
developed. However, since the human tendency to hedonism precedes reason, it has the
upper hand and ultimately wins out.64 According to Richard Dean, choosing to act
immorally entails the choice to abandon the unconditional commitment to morality. The
result is that the good will is ultimately relinquished.”65
The only way that one can be freed from radical evil and adopt a morally good
supreme maxim is through a moral revolution. Kant contends that we can become legally
good through a change in mores, but becoming morally good requires a revolution (i.e. a
rebirth) in the disposition through a “single and unalterable decision.” The revolution
occurs in the mode of thought, but gradual reformation takes place in the mode of
sense.66 Of course, divine assistance is needed for the moral revolution, but we must be
worthy of receiving it.67 Kant contends that we have the right to hope “that our weakness
and infirmity will be supplemented by the help of God if we but do the utmost that the
consciousness of our capacity tells us we are able to do.”68
Michalson feels that Kant’s comments on divine aid or grace are his attempt to
counterbalance the motivational problems encountered by a lack of assurance of moral
regeneration.69 His insistence that we merit God’s grace is also a safeguard against
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irresponsibility.70 In a more basic sense, Kant finds it necessary to appeal to divine aid in
order to preserve both radical evil and human autonomy.71 Michalson believes that in the
end, what Kant espouses is a type of human-divine synergism.72
Although this analysis is a good characterization of the general change from an
evil disposition to a good one, it is somewhat misleading with respect to the moral
revolution itself, for it seems that this event is more monergistic than synergistic. On
Kant’s own terms, a decision is not moral if it is not ultimately rooted in respect for the
moral law, and this respect cannot be empirically determined. Since Kant assumes that
we are “radically evil,” it is unclear where this moral motive arises, even in the moral
revolution itself. Kant would somehow have to argue that the decision to be a moral
could be empirically determined, and yet there is no reason to believe that this is possible
in his general schema. Indeed, this appears to be the very reason that he appeals to divine
assistance.
In another sense, Kant’s portrayal of the moral revolution as “a single and
unalterable decision” which reverses the “radical evil” in human nature could be
interpreted as a rationalistic version of the Reformed doctrine of irresistible grace, which
is certainly monergistic. The problem is not with the doctrine itself, but in the fact that
such a view of human will is inconsistent with the moral autonomy that Kant elsewhere
claims that we have. I believe that there are two possibilities for explaining these
inconsistencies: 1) Kant is firmly committed to maintaining key Reformation doctrines,
even when they contradict his own theories, and/or 2) in places where Kant’s own
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theories fall into contradictions, he is forced to appeal to divine grace. In the final
analysis, since Kant views human nature as “radically evil,” and since he espouses such a
narrow view of moral purity, he is forced to conclude that a morally pure disposition
cannot be attained without supernatural transformation. On a religious level, this has a
certain allure, but it is not characteristic of Kant’s thought in general, for it compromises
Kantian moral autonomy.

Aiming for the Highest Good
Another possibility for resolving the dilemma is Kant’s contention that we should
aim for the highest good. Perhaps this can motivate the pursuit of perfection while in a
state of assurance. Kant asserts that the best possible world is one where moral and
physical perfection are combined.73 The highest good is thus the unity of virtue and
happiness. However, neither is the cause of the other, so achieving one does not
guarantee the realization of the other.74 The finite rational will thus finds its hopes in the
attainment of these two ends. Since virtue is an end in itself, it is the superior end, and
happiness must consequently be subjugated to it.75
Kant contends that the concept of duty requires us to strive with all our powers
toward the highest good, which he describes as “the purest morality throughout the world
combined with such universal happiness as accords with it.” We can aim at both moral
purity and happiness at once, but they generally are not achieved in proper proportion.
Consequently, we must strive for morality and have faith that virtue will ultimately be
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rewarded, and this presupposes the existence of God as well as the afterlife.76 The
concept of the highest good requires us to posit the existence of God as the rewarder of
virtue and as the being in whom happiness and holiness are united.77 The afterlife is
where they who have made themselves worthy of happiness will actually participate in
it.78
Jacqueline Mariña feels that Kant’s stress on the purity of the will does not
disqualify the highest good from motivating the will altogether, for it would seem that the
pure will could be motivated by the highest good to the extent that its concept contains
the moral law.79 Andrews Reath concludes that the difficulty with Kant’s concept of the
highest good is not that it includes happiness, for Kant never claimed that happiness has
no involvement in moral conduct. Rather, it is difficult to conceive a proportionality of
virtue and happiness, expressed in a system of incentives, which does not inevitably lead
to heteronomous moral motivation.80
In reality, Kant recognizes only one moral incentive – the respect for duty itself.
He does believe that virtue deserves to be rewarded with happiness, but the prospect of
happiness cannot be a moral motive. Moreover, he does not feel that virtue is rewarded
sufficiently in the present life.81 This ultimate rewarding will be implemented by God in
the afterlife. The highest good must be the object of the pure will, but that is all that it
can be. Even the highest good cannot motivate the pure will, for the sole motivation of
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the pure will is duty for its own sake.82 In this respect, the pursuit of the highest good
itself is only of moral worth when it is of duty.83
It is obvious that Kant did not see the concept of the highest good as an incentive
to progress morally. Rather, the concept serves to remind us that we should pursue
morality for its own sake, even in the absence of other incentives, because justice
demands that morality will be rewarded with happiness in the afterlife. However, we will
only be morally worthy of this reward if the reward itself is not an incentive for us. In
essence, although the highest good is certainly an object of the good will, only the moral
law is an incentive for it, so it does not appear that this concept will resolve the dilemma
either.

Pro-Duty Inclinations
There are a number of Kantian scholars, however, that interpret Kant more
favorably on his view of moral purity, and this might provide a viable resolution of the
dilemma. Daniel Guevara states that there is an alternative reading of Kant apart from
the traditional interpretation, a reading which is based on the consideration of
counterfactuals. It says that moral motivation and worth are not spoiled in the presence
of pro-duty inclinations if these inclinations are dispensable and hence redundant.84 In
this line of interpretation, moral action is always overdetermined in Kant’s schema, for
moral law and other natural factors all contribute to moral motivation.85 Barbara Herman
concludes that for Kant, “An action has moral worth if it is required by duty and has as its
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primary motive the motive of duty.”86 Wood concurs, arguing that duty must simply be
the sufficient motive of action. Perfect virtue does not preclude the presence of
cooperating inclinations.87 The pure will is the will that acts from duty whether its nonmoral incentives support duty or oppose it.88
In effect, these Kantians believe that the pure will for Kant is not necessarily
devoid of non-moral incentives, but it must abstract itself from them. This is why Dean
believes that although a good will is often displayed in actions of moral worth, it still
remains hidden when it chooses permissible ends.89 Robert Johnson suggests that even
virtuous actions for Kant are not emotionally sterile, because virtue contains the reward
of “moral pleasure,” which surpasses mere contentment with oneself.90 The assertion
which Kant himself makes is that motives are not virtuous if they accidentally produce
dutiful action. Johnson feels that this criterion will be met so long as: 1) virtuous motives
consistently produce dutiful action regardless of the circumstances, and 2) dutiful actions
are always an expression of an underlying virtuous motive.91
This alternative reading of Kant does offer a more acceptable account of moral
purity, but I do not believe that it directly addresses the tension between assurance and
perfection, because Kant himself indicates otherwise. In this alternative reading of Kant,
having a clear conscience (i.e. believing that one is pleasing to God) would not be a
prerequisite to moral purity, because the latter can be attained with heteronomous
motives so long as respect for the moral law remains the primary incentive. As a result,
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this would eliminate the need for assurance altogether, and this is clearly contrary to what
Kant himself argues.

Offering a More Robust Account
Although Wesley’s thought exhibits a similar tension between assurance and
perfection, I believe that his emphasis on love as the chief moral motive proves to be a
more promising option for resolving the dilemma encountered by Kant.

Wesley’s Doctrines of Assurance and Perfection
Regarding his understanding of assurance, the defining moment for Wesley was
his well-known experience at Aldersgate.
In the evening I went very unwillingly to a society in Aldersgate-Street,
where one was reading Luther’s preface to the Epistle to the Romans.
About a quarter before nine, while he was describing the change which
God works in the heart through faith in Christ, I felt my heart strangely
warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation: And an
assurance was given me, that he had taken away my sins, even mine, and
saved me from the law of sin and death.92
This event would later become the cornerstone of Wesley’s doctrine of assurance.
At first, he did not interpret this experience as the witness of the Spirit, but as his true
conversion. Five days later, he related this experience to a group of people gathered at
the Hutton home, alleging that he had lacked real faith before that time. 93 However,
within a year of his Aldersgate experience, Wesley was already expressing serious doubts
concerning his status as a child of God. Apparently, the doctrine of assurance was
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Wesley’s way of overcoming his own self-doubt and fear, and he practically admits as
much, since he claims that the direct witness of the Spirit brings peace to those who are
otherwise plagued with doubts.94 The direct witness also gives assurance to those who
strive to be pleasing to God, but have “no consciousness that they are forgiven.”95 Once
again, it seems that Wesley has himself in mind.
Wesley also acknowledges the necessity of the “indirect witness,” which is
essentially the witness of conscience.96 The content of this judgment is primarily the
observance of the fruit of the Spirit in one’s own life. Nevertheless, Wesley asserts that
there is a direct witness of the Spirit beyond one’s self-evaluation, and he believes that
this assertion is validated both by the “plain natural meaning” of Scripture and by the
experience of many.97 Even if he does not assume that other people share in his doubts
and fears, he certainly supposes that all Christians experience trials and temptations, at
least from time to time. When faith is tested in this way, only the direct witness can grant
assurance.98 Wesley is indeed aware of the possibility (perhaps probability) that his
insistence on the direct witness of the Spirit might lead to exaggerations and aberrations.
“If we deny it, there is a danger lest our religion degenerate into mere formality … If we
allow it, but do not understand what we allow, we are liable to run into all the wildness of
enthusiasm.”99 However, he is willing to run this risk, because he regards this as
preferable to the omission of the doctrine altogether.100
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The other major focus of Wesley’s ethics is his doctrine of Christian perfection,
which he regards as “the grand depositum which God had lodged with the people called
Methodists, and for the sake of propagating this chiefly he appeared to have raised us
up.”101 Basically, Wesley defines Christian perfection as deliverance from all sin.
In conformity, therefore, both to the doctrine of St. John, and the whole
tenor of the New Testament, we fix this conclusion: a Christian is so far
perfect, as not to commit sin. This is the glorious privilege of every
Christian, yea, though he be but a babe in Christ. But it is only of grown
Christians it can be affirmed, they are in such a sense perfect, as,
Secondly, to be free from evil or sinful thoughts.102
In effect, at conversion believers experience: 1) justification, i.e. they are
pardoned of their sins and declared righteous on the merits of Christ’s atonement, 2)
regeneration, i.e. they are “born again” and made alive unto God, and 3) adoption, i.e.
they become God’s sons and daughters and joint heirs with Christ. At this point,
sanctification (i.e. the process of perfection) is begun. All Christians, even “newborn
babes in Christ,” are expected to not commit sin, for such is a part of repentance.
However, perfection involves the process of cleansing one’s thoughts, dispositions, and
attitudes. Consequently, Wesley is only willing to affirm the attainment of perfection in
mature believers, since he evidently does not believe that God typically makes this
transformation in us in a short period of time, let alone in an instant.
Wesley is not speaking of flawless perfection, but of a relative state of moral
perfection. Nevertheless, this type of perfection exceeds mere sincerity, since those who
would be perfect must be “cleansed from pride, anger, lust, and self-will.”103 In order for
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this to take place, the Holy Spirit must reveal to believers the depths of their own
depravity. One by one, carnal dispositions are renounced and essentially reversed, and
this frees the soul to love God and others unconditionally and unreservedly. “Yea, we do
believe that [God] will in this world so ‘cleanse the thoughts of our hearts, by the
inspiration of his Holy Spirit, that we shall perfectly love him, and worthily magnify his
holy name.’”104
Wesley contends that the moment in which perfection is attained “is constantly
both preceded and followed by a gradual work.”105 Inward sanctification thus begins
within the believer at the moment of justification, and “yet sin remains in him, yea, the
seed of all sin, till he is sanctified throughout. From that time a believer gradually dies to
sin, and grows in grace.”106 Death to sin is typically a gradual process. Nevertheless,
there must still be a terminus, a point at which the process is culminated.107 For Wesley,
the process of crucifying sinful desires is rarely, if ever, accomplished in a short amount
of time. In fact, he clearly maintains that in referring to those who have attained
perfection, “we are not now speaking of babes in Christ, but adult Christians.”108 They
can likewise be regarded as those who are “grown up into perfect men.”109 In other
words, “perfect” Christians are neither those who indefinitely progress but never attain,
nor are they immature believers.
Wesley’s desire for assurance is not nearly as strong in Christian perfection as it is
in justification. He acknowledges that a certain degree of uncertainty is inherent in
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perfection, most likely since it is more a process (which culminates at a particular point in
time) than it is an event. Even the precise moment when the process is complete can be
difficult to perceive.110 This is much different from the assurance received subsequent to
justification (i.e. the witness of the Spirit) which is an instantaneous event.
Wesley’s doctrines of assurance and Christian perfection are related in that they
are both driven by Wesley’s desire to be holy before God. Nevertheless, the two
doctrines are formed in different ways. On the one hand, Wesley’s doctrine of assurance
was essentially an interpretation of his Aldersgate experience. In other words, Wesley
theorized about what he had definitely experienced. On the other hand, Wesley never
clearly testified to having attained Christian perfection, so this doctrine remained more
theoretical and less focused on experience. It is true that Wesley was willing to allow
the experiences and claims of others to influence his views on perfection, but this can
largely be attributed to Scripture’s silence concerning whether sanctification should be
regarded as a process or as an event.111
Wesley does not believe that attaining Christian perfection in this life is ultimately
necessary for salvation. Rather, he avers that many Christians will not attain it until
death or a little before.112 In the same way, the witness of the Spirit is not necessary for
salvation, yet it does testify to the reality of justification, which is what ultimately
determines one’s eternal destiny. However, the key difference between the two doctrines
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is that striving for perfection is portrayed as a duty while the witness of the Spirit is seen
as a privilege.

Love as the Chief Moral Motive
Wesley believes that love for God is the primary affection in morality, an
affection for which Kant has little, if any, use at all. Kant does speak of the duty of
gratitude,113 and it could be argued that this implies the necessity of having gratitude
toward God. However, given his definition of moral purity, as well as the hypothetical
nature of his concept of God, it is difficult to conceive how love for God can be personal
for him as it is for Wesley. I am inclined to agree with George Croft Cell when he
alleges that although Kant provides a plausible account of moral transformation, he
completely neglects what Wesley considered to be the core of religion, namely, “the
continual sense of total dependence on God.”114 A Wesleyan commitment to duty is
ultimately a commitment to God and to others. It is not impersonal as it is in Kantianism.
Commenting on I Corinthians 13, Wesley asserts that even the most noble acts are
done in vain if they are not motivated by love.115 He thus believes that morality
originates with love itself. Indeed, love is what motivates us to obey the moral law, but
this is not the mere respect for duty that Kant advocates. Rather, Wesley affirms the
scriptural maxim that if we love God, we will keep his commandments. “Love rejoices
to obey; to do, in every point, whatever is acceptable to the beloved. A true love of God

113

Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, 203-4 [6:454-6].
George Croft Cell, The Rediscovery of John Wesley (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1935),
203.
115
Wesley, Sermon 149, “On Love,” §1, WW, 4:382 [J, 7:494-5].
114

26

hastens to do his will on earth as it is done in heaven.”116 In this way, obedience to God
is not burdensome, because it is motivated by personal love. In general, Wesley feels that
giving and receiving love is a necessary part of living the good life, because it is
necessary if one is to have “a steady, lasting satisfaction.”117
Wesley insists that true religion must include both love for God and love for
others. He believes that too many Christian thinkers emphasize one to the neglect of the
other. For example, whereas he criticizes Hutcheson for ignoring love for God, he
disparages Wollaston for overlooking the importance of love for others.118 Darlene
Fozard Weaver suggests that the same type of imbalance still exists in Christianity. “The
relative silence in contemporary Christian ethics about love for God yields an anemic
theological anthropology. Too often, the person’s self-transcendence is truncated and the
religious dimension of human life is neglected.”119
What is needed is a thorough integration of spirituality and ethics. For Wesley,
this integration is rooted in the connection between faith and love. He does not regard
faith as an end in itself, but as the means to the end of love. “Let this love be attained, by
whatever means, and I am content; I desire no more. All is well if we love the Lord our
God with all our heart and our neighbors as ourselves.”120 Wesley feels that we often try
to compensate for the lack of love in our hearts. However, “nothing is higher than this,
but Christian love, the love of our neighbor flowing from the love of God.”121
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Wesley also allows a legitimate place for self-love in his concept of perfection.
Nevertheless, he recognizes the need to limit self-love and place it in proper perspective,
for he believes that arrogance is pervasive and morally destructive. As a matter of fact,
he condemned both the skeptics and the enthusiasts for their pride.122 However, rather
than view self-love as something that should be eliminated, Wesley believes that love for
God and love for others is ultimately what prevents “pride, vanity, and self-will” from
tainting our words and actions.123 True moral motivation includes humility, and the
primary way humility is displayed is through obedience and submission to God.
Weaver agrees that love for God should serve as a norm for self-love, ruling out
works righteousness as well as a quietism that reduces love to a faith which presupposes
that God’s grace essentially nullifies human freedom and responsibility.124 Mildred
Bangs Wynkoop likewise argues that both self-interest and other-interest are “absolutely
essential to mental health.” Self-love is only sinful when it crowds out “other selves.”125
Albert Outler concurs, asserting that both self-loathing and narcissism should be avoided,
since they corrupt the relationships that we have with others.126

Love as the Motivational Link Between Assurance and Perfection
It was Wesley’s experience of assurance that led him to believe that we can only
properly love God if we have a personal conviction that our sins are forgiven.127 At

122

Wallace G. Gray, “The Place of Reason in the Theology of John Wesley” (Ph.D. dissertation; Vanderbilt
University, 1953), 216.
123
Wesley, “An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion,” §51, WW, 11:64 [J 8:20].
124
Weaver, 136.
125
Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City: Beacon Hill,
1972), 203.
126
Albert C. Outler, Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit (Nashville: Tidings, 1975), 83.
127
Wesley, “An Earnest Appeal to Men of Reason and Religion,” §61, WW, 11:70 [J 8:24].

28

justification we thus feel the love of God shed abroad in our hearts.128 Essentially, “we
cannot love God till we know he loves us.”129 In fact, when we receive assurance that
God has forgiven us, we experience not only love, but also peace and joy.130 It is not
surprising that Wesley should assert this, since he believes that consciousness of our
inward dispositions is part of the indirect witness of conscience. It is a part of discerning
our own sincerity.131
Wesley claims that new believers are consequently delivered from the guilt of sin,
but not from its power.132 Yes, believers are clearly aware that they are acceptable to
God, yet they “continually feel an heart bent to backsliding, a natural tendency to evil, a
proneness to depart from God and cleave to the things of earth.”133 Moreover, although
believers know that they have been pardoned, they still realize that they deserve
punishment.134 All of this serves to motivate the believer to pursue perfection. In other
words, we are grateful to God for pardoning us of our sins, especially since we realize
that we do not deserve forgiveness. We are also aware that our love for God is lacking in
fundamental ways. As a result, we are motivated to increase our love for God and seek to
love him with our whole hearts. This is why Wesley says that Christian perfection is
comprised in the word “love.”135
To love God is thus “to delight in him, to rejoice in his will, to desire continually
to please him, to seek and find our happiness in him, and to thirst night and day for a
fuller enjoyment of him.” In effect, as Christians “we are called to love God with all our
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heart.” However, this does not preclude loving others sincerely.136 Our love for God
actually bolsters the love that we have for others and for the moral law. In this way, the
Love Commandments are not only tied to each other, they are indeed the foundation of
the law and the prophets.

The Need for Pure Motives
Wesley sees the person as a psychosomatic unity. He thus does not bifurcate the
material and the spiritual elements of our existence as the idealists and the materialists
do.137 He also does not bifurcate the rational and the empirical as is the tendency of Kant
and other rationalists. Rather, Wesley understands moral purity to involve the proper
ordering and regulation of our affections, and this is not easily accomplished. It is this
emphasis which leads Isabel Rivers to regard Wesley’s concept of perfection as “more
demanding and ambitious” than the concept of benevolence proposed by Shaftesbury,
Hutcheson, or Hume.138 As Ray Dunning suggests, if Wesleyan perfection is to entail a
change of character, then it must include the transformation of dispositions, perceptions,
and intentions.139
There is no doubt that the Wesleyan emphasis on moral purity is personal. As
Wynkoop states, “It has always been the most profound conviction of Wesleyanism that
the Bible speaks to the moral relationships of men and not about sub-rational, non-
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personal areas of the self.”140 For Wesley, the power of sin is expelled by the power of
affection, specifically, love for God and for others.141 This can be seen in the way that
Wesley describes the perfect person:
This man can now testify to all mankind, “I am crucified with Christ;
nevertheless I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.” He is holy, as God
who called him is holy, both in life and in all manner of conversation. He
loveth the Lord his God with all his heart, and serveth Him with all his
strength. He loveth his neighbor (every man) as himself … And
whatsoever he doeth, either in word or deed, he doeth it all in the name, in
the love and power, of the Lord Jesus. In a word, he doeth the will of God
on earth as it is done in heaven.142
Notwithstanding Wesley’s account of love, Kant’s analysis cannot be ignored
completely. He is correct to point out the subjective nature of personal love. If love
becomes too personal, then it becomes too subjective and often leads to self-deception
about one’s motives. For this reason, personal commitment must be judged objectively.
Lara Denis believes that even though the assistance of other people may not be necessary
in the pursuit of our own perfection, they can still contribute to it in key ways.143 I
suggest that one of the most beneficial ways others can contribute to our moral progress
is by providing us with a third person perspective so that we might be judged as
objectively as possible. To be sure, Wesley recognizes the dangers of self-deception and
narrowness of perspective. As such, he consistently stresses the need for Christians to be
accountable to one another.
In contrast, Kant espouses a more rationalistic view of love that is indeed
objective, but he takes matters too far and ends up with an impersonal, abstract love. For
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Kant, everything revolves around the respect for duty, so we respect others to the extent
that they respect duty. He is right when he claims that we naturally respect the goodness
of the will in people who love us, but this cannot be attributed entirely to an admiration of
their moral character. Rather, we also appreciate sincere love because it indicates that
others value us. This is why we can find it flattering to be loved even by those whose
moral character is not admirable. It is true that personal love can be selfish, but in its
highest form personal love demands that we value people for their own sake, that they be
treated as ends and not merely as means to other ends. However, personal love values
others for many reasons besides their respect for duty or their status as rational beings.
Wesley provides a rather extensive description of universal love, which integrates
many of these points.
Above all, remembering that God is love, [the perfect Christian] is
conformed to the same likeness. He is full of love to his neighbor, of
universal love … Neither does he love those only that love him, or that are
endeared to him by intimacy of acquaintance … For he loves every soul
that God has made, every child of man, of whatever place or nation. And
yet this universal benevolence does in nowise interfere with a peculiar
regard for his relations, friends, and benefactors, a fervent love for his
country, and the most endeared affection to all men of integrity, of clear
and generous virtue.
His love, as to these, so to all mankind, is in itself generous and
disinterested, springing from no view of advantage to himself, from no
regard to profit or praise, no, nor even the pleasure of loving. This is the
daughter, not the parent, of his affection. By experience he knows that
social love, if it mean the love of our neighbor, is absolutely different from
self-love, even of the most allowable kind, just as different as the objects
at which they point. And yet it is sure, that, if they are under due
regulations, each will give additional force to the other, till they mix
together never to be divided.
And this universal, disinterested love is productive of all right
affections … It makes a Christian rejoice in the virtues of all and bear a
part in their happiness at the same time that he sympathizes with their
pains and compassionates their infirmities …
The same love is productive of all right actions … It guides him
into a uniform practice of justice and mercy, equally extensive with the
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principle whence it flows. It constrains him to do all possible good, of
every possible kind, to all men, and makes him invariably resolved, in
every circumstance of life, to do that, and that only, to others, which,
supposing he were himself in the same situation, he would desire they
should do to him.
And as he is easy to others, so he is easy in himself. He is free
from the painful swellings of pride, from the flames of anger, from the
impetuous gusts of irregular self-will. He is no longer tortured with envy
or malice, or with unreasonable and hurtful desire. He is no more enslaved
to the pleasures of sense, but has the full power both over his mind and
body, in a continued cheerful course of sobriety, of temperance and
chastity …
And he who seeks no praise, cannot fear dispraise. Censure gives
him no uneasiness, being conscious to himself that he would not willingly
offend, and that he has the approbation of the Lord of all … So that, in
honor or shame, in abundance or want, in ease or pain, in life or in death,
always, and in all things, he has learned to be content, to be easy, thankful,
happy.144
Notice that when Wesley speaks of “disinterested love,” he is not indicating the
absence of self-love altogether. What he asserts is that genuine love for others is not
ultimately motivated by self-love. Rather, people are loved for their own sakes. In fact,
Wesley claims that self-love and universal love, when properly regulated, can actually
strengthen one another. As such, Wesley emphasizes universality in love without
sacrificing personal love or self-love in the process. Moreover, love is not confined to
personal affection, but encompasses a respect for morality and duty. This is certainly a
more robust account of love than Kant offers, and it consequently proves itself to be more
fruitful.
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Conclusion
For Kant, even dutiful actions performed from feelings of love or sympathy do
not have moral worth.145 By excluding beneficent emotions as proper moral motives,
Kant effectively discriminates against those who are naturally disposed to act from
altruistic emotions more so than from duty alone.146 According to Tom Sorell, Kant’s
ethics should either prescind from this type of circumstantial or constitutional luck, or not
be equally binding on everyone.147 However, Kant was aware of this dilemma as it
appears in moral education. Moral incentives cannot determine the will, else freedom
will be destroyed. On the other hand, mere inducements are generally insufficient for
proper moral motivation. Kant concluded that a sense of duty should be developed
before moral feeling can be properly realized.148 In Wesleyan ethics, this emphasis is
reflected in understanding love as the motivation for fulfilling the law.
Wesley does not regard love as a hindrance to keeping one’s duty. Rather, love is
the specific motivation for keeping the law.149 In Wesley’s mind, God’s will cannot be
separated from God’s nature.150 Consequently, love for God naturally includes a love for
God’s will, i.e. the moral law. Nevertheless, love is not limited to the mere performance
of duty, because love seeks to act in ways beyond that which is demanded by duty
alone.151 Even Kantians like Onora O’Neill realize that although such acts of
supererogation are not addressed in many ethical systems, especially Kant’s, they are still
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ethically admirable.152 As Donald Walhout points out, it is more practical to endorse acts
of supererogation, so long as they do not conflict with morality, because they help to
prevent pharisaic concern for others, i.e. being ultimately motivated by one’s own virtue
and perfection.153
All love is not equally moral, since love can become narrow and self-centered in
varying degrees. Kant avoided this motivational problem by precluding love from his
definition of moral purity. He thought that if we could be driven solely by the respect for
morality itself, only then we could be certain that our motives are pure. Unfortunately,
this opens up other kinds of problems, as we have seen.
Wesley’s emphasis on love as the chief moral motive solves the problems created
by Kant’s narrow definition of moral purity. However, it becomes the task at hand to
evaluate the morality of love, if it is indeed to be the main factor in moral motivation.
Love must be carefully scrutinized so as to determine the morality of motives in a given
situation. Additionally, there will be a need to strive for the perfection of actions as well.
As John Cobb indicates, the presence of love does not guarantee knowledge or
understanding. Granted, a certain knowledge of the beloved is requisite to love.
However, people who love God and others may not understand the benefit or harm of
their actions, nor may they always agree as to “what actions properly express love.”154 In
the end, a robust account of morality should begin with love as the chief moral motive,
then it must focus on the morality of actions. In terms of our own morality, if careful
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scrutiny deems our motives and our actions to be moral, then perhaps we can have some
assurance that we are making progress in the pursuit of perfection.

36

